



*America's Alliances and the Next Administration:
Next Generation Thinking about
U.S. Strategy toward East Asia*



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Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making, generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees. Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by Chevron, the Henry Luce Foundation, and the Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com.

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The views expressed here represent personal impressions and reflections of Young Leader program participants; they do not necessarily represent the views of the relevant governments, or the co-sponsoring or parent organizations and institutes.

Introduction

By Brad Glosserman

For over a decade, the United States has not articulated a strategy to deal with Asia. This is a marked break with the past. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, successive U.S. administrations released four “East Asia Strategy Reports” to explain U.S. policy toward this vital region. In contrast, the Bush administration has preferred to take a global approach and has deliberately refused to craft regional strategies.

Convinced that a regional approach is needed now more than ever, the Pacific Forum CSIS has joined four other institutions – the CNA Corporation, the Institute for Defense Analyses, the Institute for National and Strategic Studies of the National Defense University, and the Center for a New American Security – to produce an East Asia Strategy Report for the next U.S. administration. The five have convened a series of workshops to explore the dimensions of U.S. engagement with Asia. The second meeting was held in Honolulu, hosted by Pacific Forum, and focused on U.S. relations with its Asian allies.

A small group of Young Leaders also attended this meeting. (In keeping with the project’s intent to craft a U.S. strategy, only American YLs were invited; we hope to get responses from Asian Young Leaders when the final report is available.) They were asked to develop recommendations for U.S. relations with its allies in the region. The two groups reached common conclusions. First, despite an evolving security environment, they agreed on the need to continue these alliances. While these relationships need to change, to refocus on new security challenges (without ignoring enduring threats) and to accommodate a new dynamic among the U.S. and its partners, our Young Leaders were not prepared to abandon these longstanding relationships.

Second, the Young Leaders agree that more efforts should be made to coordinate the various alliances and promote cooperation among them. They are skeptical about – if not opposed to – the notion of linking them together in a formal network. They worry that neither U.S. allies nor other nations in the region would respond well to such an approach. This would likely be seen as an attempt to contain China and would be tantamount to “drawing a line through the region.” It would alienate friends and potential partners.

Finally, while appreciating the value of strong ties among militaries within the region, Young Leaders believe that the alliances should evolve toward more comprehensive strategies that reduce the burden on mil-mil relations. While there are tasks and assignments that only militaries can perform, Young Leaders believe that the U.S. should broaden engagement with its partners and better balance relations among military, economic, and social pillars.

This is the first in a series of Young Leader assessments of the future of U.S. relations with Asia. We hope to publish more soon.

U.S. Alliances in the Asia Pacific

by Priscilla Baek, Justin Bishop,
Brian Harding, and Christina Monroe

With the changing security environment in the post-Cold War era and growing concern over nontraditional, transnational threats, it is vital that the United States reevaluate the role of its alliances as a means of security cooperation. In this paper, we analyze the role alliances play in U.S. strategy toward the Asia Pacific, focusing on its five allies in the region: Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. We argue that alliances are still necessary in a post-Cold War world to ensure the national security and military flexibility of the U.S. as well as regional stability in the Asia Pacific. However, these alliances need to be adjusted and constantly re-examined to meet more nontraditional security needs of the 21st century.

We also observe that the appropriate use of alliances in U.S. strategy varies according to each country due to the wide variety of interests and differences in perceptions toward the U.S. in these countries, showing that the U.S. should not look at the Asia Pacific as a monolithic region. Furthermore, we argue that the glue that can hold these alliances together in the post-Cold War era in the absence of a single common threat is the alignment of mutual interests. These mutual interests go beyond conventional military to military relations that existed during the Cold War era and extend into the arenas of international trade and economic security, resource scarcity management and energy security, disaster management, and counter-terrorism.

Finally, we discuss whether U.S. alliances in the Asia Pacific should be linked and how much weight should be given to military-military relations in the overall bilateral relationships. Although linking the spokes of the current hub-and-spoke alliance structure would strengthen the U.S. presence in the Asia Pacific, we argue that creating a multilateral alliance structure would be politically and practically inconceivable due to unresolved historical conflicts, varying perceptions of regional security, and most importantly, the possibility of initiating a regional struggle for influence between the United States and China. We propose that while more comprehensive alliances should be promoted to include the transfer of soft power, economic resources, and civil assistance, military relations are still important in achieving both bilateral and regional objectives, and thus should be maintained and improved.

Are alliances needed in a post-Cold War world?

The United States' alliances are critical to maintaining stability in the Asia Pacific. Despite the end of the Cold War, U.S. alliances continue to provide much needed security in East Asia. These alliances deter threats and potential threats, provide security assurances for weaker military powers, keep military budgets in Asia relatively low, and provide the United States with freedom of action and strategic forward deployment. Meanwhile, many Asian nations see the U.S. security alliances as a way to guarantee their own security.

This isn't to say that these alliances don't need to change. The U.S. alliance structure in Asia was established in the tense atmosphere of the Cold War, and many of its functions and, to a lesser degree, some of the threats it was created to counter no longer exist. Indeed, as the global threat environment changes, the United States and its allies must adjust their security partnerships for their own, usually mutual, national interests. In particular, non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, climate change, and resource scarcity will define much of the 21st-century security environment and the U.S. security alliances should be leveraged to counter these threats because they are the deepest, most important levers of U.S. power abroad.

It should be remembered that alliances are two-way streets and U.S. allies benefit considerably from their alliance with the United States in ways that transcend collective defense and extended deterrence. In almost every case except Japan, U.S. forces stationed on allied territories pay the majority of costs. However, their militaries are allowed to train with U.S. forces and allied NCOs and officers are able to attend advanced U.S. military schools, as well as participate in exercises to improve their warfighting tactics and strategy. Alliance partners also gain access to military technology and weapon systems, which give their militaries an extra edge. Favored trade status, enhanced political partnerships and global visibility are all benefits of being allied with the United States as well. Lastly, the benefits of extended deterrence cannot be overemphasized. Since the end of the Korean War, no U.S. treaty ally has been attacked by conventional, offensive military aggression. Indeed, U.S. military forces act as a force multiplier for allied military forces.

It behooves the United States to nurture and enhance regional alliances. Allies provide critical and often reliable assistance when national interests intersect. Japan, Korea, and Australia all support the U.S. war on terror, sending troops to assist U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, or by running re-supply missions in the Indian Ocean. They provide critical intelligence to the United States in regions the United States cannot cover, and in turn act as force multipliers for the United States as well.

It is critical that alliances are not thrown away despite the absence of an easily-identifiable common enemy. The end of the Cold War has defeated one threat, but has exposed new ones. Our alliances can be reconfigured into new tools and used to deal with the new security issues that have emerged since the alliances were established.

What is the appropriate role of alliances in the U.S. Asia strategy?

Each U.S. alliance in the Asia Pacific works toward different ends and these ends evolve over time. These changes arise as each country's national interests change in response to the rise of new threats. However, the U.S. national interest decides each alliance's appropriate role within a larger Asian geo-strategic context. U.S. Asia strategy demands stability: the alliances are used as tools to ensure and strengthen this strategy by decreasing the likelihood of a major conventional conflict (something that the alliance structure has done fairly successfully since the Vietnam War), strengthening and protecting trade and commerce throughout the region, and handling nontraditional security threats such as climate change, terrorism, and resource scarcity.

The U.S.-Japan alliance is arguably the most important alliance in the region. It served an important role during the Cold War, continues to undergird the security of the Asia Pacific, and is maturing into a more equal partnership with a global orientation. The United States continues to encourage Japan to become a more “normal” country and for the alliance to go from a regional to a more global orientation. Indeed, the time for United States and Japanese forces to work abroad in humanitarian and disaster relief crises. An area where Japan has much capacity to provide has arrived. Furthermore, closer U.S. and Japanese coordination in development assistance will provide training for military and political leaders in times of crisis and increase soft power.

The U.S.-ROK alliance has had its ups and downs, but this alliance is in no danger of disappearing. This alliance also needs to take on a global role, similar to that of the U.S.-Japan alliance. South Korea is working to create a first-class military, which could be a greater asset than Japan’s first-rate military since it has less political constraints than Japan’s. South Korea can send its military abroad much more easily and should work more with the United States and Japan in this regard. The United States needs better coordination with the ROK and to treat it like a peer in their joint activities.

The U.S.-Australia alliance has always been a global alliance, symbolized by U.S. and Australian troops fighting side by side in several wars. The United States depends on Australia to secure many of its own interests in maritime Southeast Asia and Oceania security. The alliance isn’t perfect, but is very strong politically and there is genuine affection between the two countries. Of course, the alliance could always be improved. In particular, the United States needs to continue defense integration with Australia, and continue to enhance the bilateral relationship in all facets. Australia, in similar fashion to South Korea and Japan, could allow the United States to launch missions against terrorist or harmful nonstate actors, work with the United States to develop environmentally friendly technology, or work with the United States to defend Taiwan in a military contingency.

The U.S.-Philippines security alliance has many problems, due to historical issues and the painful experience surrounding the end of U.S. bases in the country. However, the alliance still holds potential to become a regional tool. For starters, a lingering U.S. orientation among the country’s elite can help the Philippines express U.S. interests in ASEAN. Militarily, our troops routinely train together, the United States retains access agreements, and personal military ties run deep. If oil or natural gas is discovered in Philippine-claimed areas of the South China Sea, the United States might convince the Philippines to allow it to lead a consortium to exploit it. In the meantime, the two countries share intelligence, hold an annual military exercise of considerable scope (*Balikatan*), and the Philippines is comfortable enough with the United States to allow approximately 2,000 U.S. military “advisors” to assist in Manila’s efforts in Mindanao.

The U.S.-Thailand alliance has many of the same characteristics of that with the Philippines. While the alliance is far from the alliance of the Vietnam era, it continues to serve core U.S. interests in the region. Most importantly, Thailand provides the United States with extraordinary access to its bases (for instance the use of U Tapao for Iraq and Afghanistan operations and in response to the 2004 tsunami). It also provides cooperation in

intelligence sharing and operations. Furthermore, Thailand hosts the annual *Cobra Gold* exercise, the largest multilateral military operation in the Pacific. The United States must be vigilant in the maintenance of this alliance, particularly in light of Thailand's attraction to China, because it remains our most reliable ally in Southeast Asia.

The role of alliances in U.S. Asia strategy is as varied as the alliances themselves, but the United States can use every single one of them to its own advantage. The United States needs to give its allies more of the recognition they seek, and let them evolve from a Cold War context into a greater regional or global context. That said, the United States must cultivate other bilateral relations in the region and not simply rely on its allies to achieve its objectives. With a sensible approach to the region, with allies first and smart engagement with other regional partners and participation in multilateral fora, the United States will best further its national interests. In the end, though, its alliance relationships are its deepest and long-lasting in the region, a fact that should not be lost on strategic thinkers looking to craft a U.S. strategy in Asia for the 21st century.

Should the United States link its Asia-Pacific alliances?

The prospect of linking the five U.S. alliances in the Asia Pacific is tempting. If the spokes of the current hub-and-spoke architecture were connected, the alliances would surely be more potent than the sum of their parts. However, any such arrangement will and should be dismissed as wishful thinking.

For starters, it is politically inconceivable that our five partners would join a NATO-style arrangement for the Pacific or even a loose amalgamation limited to summits. In Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea harbor mutual suspicions and discussion of even trilateral cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States is tepid. Even ardent Japanese supporters of a league of democracies based on shared values tend to sideline South Korea in their thinking. In Southeast Asia, the U.S.-Thailand and U.S.-Philippines alliances are not as strong as in the past and do not currently lend themselves to trilateral dialogue, let alone a broad regional grouping. Australia is keen to link itself with Japan and the United States, as it sees itself as a key node in managing the Asia Pacific, but seeks a more open regionalism than simply a linking of U.S. alliances, as was expressed in Kevin Rudd's proposal for an Asia-Pacific regional community.

Even if the leaders of these six democracies were to agree that an arrangement of U.S. allies would be a good idea, this is not the world that exists: The ever-present feature of contemporary Asia is China's rise. The rise of China and declining relative influence of the United States in Asia are forces that Asian countries must consider when making policy decisions. While the consequences of these broad dynamics are debatable and countries in the region – including these allies – are hedging in diverse ways, their primary concern is not to become pawns in a regional struggle for influence between the United States and China.

China argues that the U.S. alliance structure is a relic of the Cold War and has no relevance today. More or less, they ask the question, “Who are you allied *against*?” and argue that their system of strategic partnerships is better than alliances, which they feel explicitly target “third parties” (read: China). Linking the alliances would make answering these charges exceedingly difficult. Although the United States and its allies could argue that the linked alliances simply serve to provide common goods for the region, the perception will be that it is a coalition against China. This would likely produce the kind of Chinese behavior that all regional players hope to avoid. If there were any doubt that a competition for influence was taking place, this arrangement would begin it.

Perhaps it is telling that the only U.S. ally that seems ready to entertain the possibility of a grand linking of alliances is Japan, which seems prone to hedge against China. South Korea, although a U.S. ally, increasingly places as strong an emphasis on good relations with China as with the United States due to its reliance on China for its own prosperity. Australia hopes for an open regionalism that fosters stable relations between the United States and China and whose prime minister, Kevin Rudd, sees it as his role to help manage relations between the two powers. Thailand, although a U.S. ally, is arguably closer to China at the moment and would loathe to offend Beijing. The Philippines might side with the United States, but is more interested in stable Sino-U.S. relations than to risk their deterioration.

While the linking of alliances could leverage these relationships in an ideal world, the importance of stable Sino-U.S. relations and each ally’s bilateral relations with China mitigate a grand linking of U.S. alliances in the Pacific. Instead, trilateral dialogue among allies, such as U.S.-Japan-Australia or U.S.-Japan-ROK, is the only likely arrangements for the foreseeable future. Even quadrilateral arrangement would confirm Chinese fears that U.S. allies in the Pacific are looking to form an anti-China bloc.

What is the appropriate role of military-military relations in the alliances?

U.S. alliances in the Asia Pacific have their roots in military-military relations, which continue to form the backbone of the partnerships, although to varying degrees. To start, U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea were born out of war.

The U.S.-Japan relationship is wide and deep across many fields, but the military alliance will continue to bind the relationship so long as the United States maintains bases in Japan and stations tens of thousands of troops in the country. Furthermore, not only does the military relationship undergird the overall relationship, it is the centerpiece of security across the Asia Pacific and ensures U.S. forward presence to protect U.S. interests, Japan itself, and provide public goods for the entire region.

Similarly, as long as South Korea is at war with the North and U.S. troops are based in the South, military relations will form the cornerstone of the U.S.-ROK relationship. However, the alliance may come into question following the reunification of the Korean Peninsula and should therefore take on a more regional and global orientation if the alliance is to survive.

The U.S.-Australia relationship is also much broader than the military relationship, but military relations will continue to be a key component of the relationship as well. In particular, the United States relies on Australia's capabilities to help ensure stability in the South Pacific and they work together to promote stability in maritime Southeast Asia. All together, while the military component is less important to this alliance than in those in Northeast Asia, it plays a role that is neither insignificant nor overbearing.

Although military aspects of the U.S.-Thailand relationship have not been particularly apparent since the end of the Vietnam era, military ties have provided crucial stability to the bilateral relationship throughout Thailand's turbulent history. Furthermore, Thailand has been instrumental as an interlocutor for regional military cooperation through the hosting of *Cobra Gold*. For these reasons, military relations will be critical to maintaining stability in bilateral relations and ensuring regional stability for the foreseeable future.

Likewise, military relations with the Philippines continue to be the most stable part of the bilateral relationship and the area in which the Philippines can best assist the United States achieve its objectives in Asia. With weak civilian leadership in the Philippines, the relationship has been repeatedly challenged, and likely will continue to be challenged in the future, but military relations continue to anchor the overall relationship.

While it is in the U.S. interest to deepen engagement with its allies in Asia in all fields, there is no reason to decrease the current emphasis on military relations within the overall partnerships. These military relations are important to achieving bilateral and regional objectives and should not be abandoned.

Conclusion

We argue that alliances remain necessary in a post-Cold War world to ensure the national security and military flexibility of the U.S. as well as regional stability in the Asia Pacific. However, these alliances need to be adjusted and re-examined to meet the changing environment and interests of the U.S. and allies, as well as the nontraditional security needs of the 21st century. The five U.S. allies in the region – Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand – should remain pillars of the U.S. Asia strategy, but need not form a larger alliance, especially one that excludes, and thereby irritates, China. Military-to-military relations should continue to be strong, especially in countries where military relations have proven more positive and stable than political ones. Finally, with the changing security environment and growing concern over nontraditional, transnational threats, it is vital that the United States maintain while constantly reevaluating the role of its alliances as a means of security cooperation.

The Alliance: Redefining Relationships Between the U.S. and the Asia-Pacific Region in the 21st Century

By John Friend, Kristi Elaine Govella, Ana Villavicencio,
Adrian Yi, and Stephanie Young

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the deterioration of the Warsaw Pact, the United States must protect its interests and safeguard against threats in an international security environment much different than the one that defined the Cold War era. Russia and its nuclear stockpile no longer represent an overarching threat to the United States and its allies. Instead of a monolithic Soviet bloc, the U.S. now confronts a diverse array of challenges that threaten the political, economic, and social stability of international politics.

The Sept. 11, 2001 attacks represent one of the many emerging problems. Indeed, advances in technology have made terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah more dangerous, but the 2003 Invasion of Iraq and the Global War on Terror have led to an obsession with the Middle East and the Muslim world at large. In fact, both the 2002 and 2006 *National Security Strategy* appear to be more of a framework for confronting terrorism and building democracy in the Middle East than an overall strategy for the United States in a post-Cold War world. While stability in the Middle East is necessary for promoting international security and ensuring access to key resources in the region, emerging threats in other parts of the world will not stand idly by; in fact, they will become worse over time. In many ways, U.S. policymaking operates with blinders, capable of focusing only on one threat at a time. This was the case with the Soviet Union during the Cold War and remains so with our current entanglement in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Current international political conditions dictate a broader outlook to cope with the wide range of security threats now confronting the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, we have seen the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as increases in ethnic conflict, drug trafficking, human rights violations, pandemic disease, climate change, and general instability. Although manifestations of each of these threats can be found in Asia, U.S. foreign policy continues to lack a well-developed Asia security strategy, and the region has remained on the periphery of U.S. policymaking. This is problematic given continually rising tensions in Northeast Asia and the struggle for internal control taking place in many countries. Some of the targeted organizations in the war on terror, such as Jemaah Islamiya, Laskar Jihad, and the Abu Sayyaf Group, train and operate within Southeast Asia, illustrating the increasingly transnational nature of the problems facing the U.S. Furthermore, the region is not free from traditional security threats. Both North Korea and the Taiwan Strait remain potential hot spots in the region. More generally, the rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has prompted a great deal of speculation about the long-term intentions of the PRC, which remain ambiguous. This changing balance of power in the region poses difficult questions for the U.S. and for Japan, a key ally in the region.

To effectively confront and mitigate these growing problems, the next U.S. administration must do what many of the previous administrations have failed to do: it must look toward Asia and work with key players in the region to ensure that none of these

security issues becomes unmanageable. The administration that takes office in January 2009 will need to remain steadfast in the Middle East, but this report posits that engagement of East Asia is equally crucial. These two regions are not isolated from one another, but are interconnected in complex and dynamic ways. For example, Al-Qaeda operates in the Middle East but has offshoots in Southeast Asia. The A.Q. Kahn trail originated in Pakistan and found its way to North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Treating any region or problem in isolation in today's increasingly interconnected world will inevitably fail, since such an approach is akin to treating the symptoms and not the root cause of a phenomenon. A more comprehensive and flexible method of engagement is necessary.

The possibility of further instability and conflict in Asia demonstrates the importance of maintaining, building, and redefining alliance structures in the region. However, alliances without a clear regional security strategy are useless and possibly burdensome. The U.S. must define what is expected from its alliances and partnerships, rather than leave such important matters open to the possibility of faulty interpretation(s). In today's interconnected world, alliances are invaluable and inevitable. Despite a shift from the traditional alliance structures that characterized the Cold War security order, these alliances can and should continue; they represent bonds that must be nurtured and utilized in ways that leverage their strengths in the emerging security order. What used to hold alliances together – arguably the shared interests and goals of states – can no longer be considered the foundation of alliances in the 21st century because the U.S. faces security challenges that transcend the concepts of borders and nations. To confront, manage, and eliminate today's security threats, alliance structures must move beyond bilateral negotiations and cooperation and instead seek to integrate state and nonstate actors regionally if not globally. In the future, alliances will be rooted in the notion that regional and sub-regional cooperation of nations and nonstate actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and supranational governing bodies, is essential to achieving shared goals and deterring transnational threats. This more inclusive conceptualization of alliances will allow them to facilitate the type of flexible and integrated response necessary to combat modern threats. At the same time, the United States must pay attention to how these different tools fit together as part of a cohesive and effective strategy. For example, joining every regional organization in Asia is not the solution to coping with regional problems. The U.S. should be selective and strategic about its participation in groups, upholding current commitments to allies and partners while branching out in necessary new directions.

The shortcomings of the Six-Party Talks illustrate some of the advantages of this approach. While the Six-Party Talks are intended to manage the North Korea nuclear problem, they have been conducted as a series of linked bilateral negotiations as opposed to an integrated cooperation and negotiation among participating states. The U.S. failure to lead collaboration within the talks even among traditional allies Japan and South Korea has resulted in the continuation of a bilateral security structure. North Korea's "TongMi BongNam" policy literally translates to "align with the U.S. and contain South Korea," which has resulted in U.S.-DPRK bilateral meetings followed by the isolation of South Korea as well as Japan. Rather than letting traditional allies settle for diminished roles in resolving transnational threats and continuing traditional bilateral negotiations, the U.S. must reaffirm and renew traditional alliances in the context of a cohesive regional security structure to

counter immediate threats such as nuclear proliferation in Asia. Without restructuring key bilateral alliances into a multilateral security structure, there will be a vacuum of regional leadership that China will and has been quick to fill. A disjointed, non-cohesive security structure has created an opportunity for China to step up as a regional leader in the Six-Party Talks. The U.S. must not allow its two most formidable Asian alliances, Japan and South Korea, to be pushed aside; rather the U.S. should support a new alliance structure that facilitates a cooperative security strategy especially between the U.S., Japan and South Korea within the context of the Six-Party Talks to effectively respond to today's nontraditional security threats.

Bilateral alliances will continue to serve a purpose, but linking alliances by focusing solely on military-to-military interaction will not be the best long-term policy. Rather than linking alliances with multiple countries, which may create polarized and competing positions in the region, the U.S. should expend resources on programs and organizations that enable economic growth and good governance to spread, regardless of political boundaries. Nongovernmental organizations and intergovernmental bodies such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and others that help less developed countries to invest in infrastructure, healthcare, and industry should be supported both economically and politically. By continuing efforts to create a world in which economic prosperity and freedom are the building blocks, the United States will enable countries in East Asia to care for themselves and not solely rely on the United States to play the role of global law enforcement, banker, and security force.

The idea that military-to-military relationships and alliances between the United States and many Asian countries should exist now and in the future is not new. However, the United States should increase efforts to reassure our alliance partners (and those with which we hope to improve relations) that our intentions are noble. If the U.S. can maintain trust through transparency, our relationships in Asia will be far more fruitful. By using our military to focus on training, education, and humanitarian missions, the U.S. will be able to positively affect the lives of millions, while improving its image around the globe.

By focusing our military on education and threats other than battle-type conflict, the U.S. could spend less money and expend fewer human resources when cooperating with our allies on nontraditional security issues. Nontraditional threats such as climate change, infectious diseases, natural disasters, and transnational crime are a serious concern. For example, new reports are constantly revealing the consequences of climate change and its effects throughout the world. Southeast Asia has already seen the horrible effects of climate change through stronger and more frequent natural disasters, resulting in loss of life and increased strain on many economies. In order to secure Asia from nontraditional threats, it is important that major powers take a more active role; this is an area in which U.S. alliances and partnerships are a logical way to promote stability. The U.S. should look at alliances as partnerships that provide members with a role in future and existing regional projects. For example, Australia is achieving strong influence in Southeast Asia; Japan is an important player in development of environmental technology and in implementing international development initiatives. The U.S. could work together with Australia and Japan and other Asian countries to advance the region's ability to address environmental degradation,

poverty, humanitarian relief initiatives, pandemics, and natural disaster preparedness. It is in the interest of the United States to help develop and foster projects that will improve the quality of life for citizens. If the U.S. acts on this opportunity, it will acquire increased trust in the region. Countries in Asia, and throughout the world, will gradually see the U.S. as a powerful nation concerned with global humanitarian issues and not solely focused on fighting the Muslim world.

Strategic relationships between the United States and countries in East Asia are as diverse as the cultures within the region. There is no “one size fits all” formula for the United States to follow as the geography, history, and security threats for each drastically differ. The U.S. should define each alliance so that the details of each alliance show the strong U.S. commitment to each country. The U.S. must display a willingness to consider its partner’s point of view and their relationships with other countries in the region.

The U.S. military should also concentrate resources on education programs like those at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). The APCSS integrates young leaders from around the Asia Pacific region to learn about each other and the fundamentals of good governance in a comfortable off-the-record atmosphere. By educating up-and-coming leaders from Asian countries, the United States is enabling them to “improve security within their borders, humanely govern their people, administer the rule of law, provide food and shelter to the indigent, and cooperate productively with their neighbors.”¹ By concentrating on integration, joint training/exercises, and mutual support, the United States and countries in the Asia region will enjoy prosperity and stability in the long term.

In order for the United States to play a continued role in Asia, much attention and energy must be focused on nurturing our alliances and improving partnerships across a spectrum of issues. If the United States is either incapable or unwilling to take charge in the region, competing powers like China will. The United States must be willing to change the way in which alliances have traditionally been established in Asia. By strengthening a system in which broad transnational issues (i.e., global warming, poverty, pandemics, and humanitarian relief efforts) are the focus, strong allies and partners, capable of enduring the unforeseen and anticipated power shifts, will flourish. In order to effectively deal with issues in Asia, reassessing the structure of the United States’ alliances is imperative in formulating a comprehensive security strategy.

¹ Myers, Richard B. (Gen) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Improving Lives: Military Humanitarian and Assistance Programs. Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State November 2004. Access date 31 July 2008. <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1104/ijpe/ijpe1104.htm>

APPENDIX A

About the Authors

Ms. Priscilla Eunkyung BAEK is a Korean Flagship Fellow and Master's candidate in Korean Language Studies for Professionals at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. She graduated from Duke University in 2007 and majored in Public Policy and Spanish Studies.

Mr. Justin BISHOP is pursuing an MA in Diplomacy and Military Studies at Hawaii Pacific University and is an intern at Pacific Forum CSIS. He is also a researcher/integrator at Cubic Applications.

Mr. John FRIEND is a student affiliate with the East-West Center and a Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science, University of Hawaii at Manoa, where he focuses on competing theories of international politics and security, American foreign policy, and contemporary political thought. He holds a BA in Anthropology from the University of California, Berkeley and an MS in Defense and Strategic Studies from Missouri State University. He worked at the National Institute for Public Policy (in Washington, DC) and is a Graduate Research Assistant with the School of Pacific and Asian Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa.

Ms. Kristi Elaine GOVELLA is a Ph.D. student at the University of California, Berkeley, where she focuses on international relations and comparative politics in East Asia. She specializes in Japanese politics and Asian regional institutional architecture and also serves as the Project Director of the Berkeley APEC Study Center. Ms. Govella holds a double BA in Political Science and Japanese from the University of Washington, Seattle, and an MA in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. She has worked with the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, in addition to teaching English in Japan through the JET Program.

Mr. Brian HARDING is a research associate in the International Security Program (ISP) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he focuses on Southeast Asia and Japan. Prior to joining CSIS, he was a Fulbright fellow in Indonesia, where he studied the significance of Chinese Indonesians in the China-Indonesia bilateral relationship and served as codirector of the Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation's Indonesia initiative. Previously, he was a research assistant for Improving the Nation's Security Decisions project, a research assistant at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), an intern at CSIS, and a volunteer English teacher in Nong Khai, Thailand. He holds a BA in history and Japan studies from Middlebury College and an MA in Asian studies from the Elliott School at George Washington University.

Ms. Christina MONROE is the Professional Development and Internships Coordinator at the East-West Center in Honolulu. She was an APLP 2004-2005 Fellow. Ms. Monroe earned an MA in Social Sciences (ethnicity and nationalism) from the Universiteit van Amsterdam, The Netherlands, where she conducted research on cultural identification of female students

from Asia living in Western Europe. She was a lecturer and internships coordinator for the Chancellor's Leadership Program and Director of the Service Learning Program at the University of Colorado at Boulder from 1998 to 2002. Her interest in international exchange stems from her student experiences in Austria and Spain, professional exchange in Cuba, research experience in Guatemala (funded by NEA Leadership Grant for Educators), and volunteer experience as an elections monitor for the 2000 Mexican presidential elections. She received a BA degree in sociology (*magna cum laude*, Phi Beta Kappa) from the University of Tulsa, Oklahoma.

Ms. Ana VILLAVICENCIO is the program officer at Pacific Forum CSIS. She received her dual BA in Environmental Studies and International Relations from Hawaii Pacific University and an MA in Political Science from University of Hawaii.

Mr. Adrian YI is working on an MA in Korean at the University of Hawaii, Manoa. He graduated from the University of Puget Sound with a BA in Foreign Languages (Japanese and Chinese) and International Affairs in 2005, after graduating; Mr. Yi also worked with the State Department at the American Institute in Taiwan.. He studied abroad in Japan through the Rotary Program from 2000-2001.

Ms. Stephanie YOUNG is a historian at the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) where she researches circumstances of loss for U.S. service members who remain unaccounted for from World War II and the Korean War. She joined JPAC as an Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) fellow in 2006, the same year in which she received an MA in Diplomacy and Military Studies from Hawaii Pacific University. Previously she participated in an exchange program to Soonchuhnyang University, Republic of Korea. The exchange program was organized through Hawaii Pacific University where she also received a BA in Political Science and a minor in Korean Studies.

APPENDIX B

Asia Strategy and Policy Report Workshop 2 **America's Alliances and the Next Administration**

**Co-hosts: Pacific Forum CSIS
Institute for Defense Analyses
Center for Naval Analysis
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Center for a New American Security**

May 21-22, 2008
DoubleTree Alana Waikiki Hotel, Honolulu Hawaii

Agenda

May 20 – TUESDAY

Participants arrive

6:30 PM **Reception and Informal Opening Dinner - Pool Deck –Mezzanine Level**

May 21 – WEDNESDAY

8:30 AM **Continental Breakfast - Room 303 – 3rd floor meeting room**

9:00 AM **Welcome and Administrative Remarks**

9:15 AM **Session 1: Transformation of U.S. Forces in Asia**

This session will feature a briefing from Pacific Command on the nature of the transformation of U.S. forces in the Pacific. This will provide a context for the discussion of individual alliance relationships that will follow. What is the role that Guam will play in future U.S. thinking about the region? How does this transformation change the U.S. calculus regarding its traditional alliances? What is the impact of U.S. engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Presenter: Brig. Gen. Edwin Vincent

10:45 AM **Coffee Break**

11:00 AM **Session 2: The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship**

This session focuses on key issues in the US-Japan security relationship, and the alliance in particular. What is the desired relationship? What prevents it from realizing its potential? How can those obstacles be overcome? Should the alliance continue to be the cornerstone of U.S. engagement in Asia? How

May 21 – WEDNESDAY (cont'd.)

should the U.S. balance its relationship with Japan with those with Korea and China? How do strategic (nuclear) relations impact this relationship?

Presenter: Dr. David Fouse

12:30 PM **Lunch - J Bistro –Lobby Level**

2:00 PM **Session 3: The U.S.-ROK Security Relationship**

This session focuses on key issues in the US-ROK security relationship, and the alliance in particular. What is the desired relationship? What prevents it from realizing its potential? How can those obstacles be overcome? How can the U.S. balance its relationship with Korea with that with Japan? What should the U.S. position be on the transfer of operational command back to the ROK? Discussion of inter-Korean relations should be put off (as best possible) to the next session.

Presenter: Mr. Carl Baker

3:15 PM **Coffee Break**

3:30 PM **Session 4: Other Developments on The Korean Peninsula**

This session will look at the impact of the Six-Party Talks and progress in U.S.-North Korea relations on the U.S. strategic posture in Asia and Northeast Asia. This session should not focus on the SPT or the appropriate U.S. policy in them (that can be covered in another meeting) but how projected outcomes could affect alliance relations. This session should also address the impact of North-South relations on the U.S.-ROK alliance and the prospects and desirability of a multilateral security framework resulting from these talks.

Presenter: Mr. Ralph Cossa

5:00 PM **Adjourn for the day**

6:30 PM **Reception and Dinner - Pool Deck –Mezzanine Level**

May 22 – THURSDAY

8:30 AM **Continental Breakfast - Room 303 – 3rd floor meeting room**

9:00 AM **Session 5: The U.S.-Australia Alliance**

This session looks at the state of the U.S.-Australia alliance and its role in America's Asia strategy. How do changes in Australian politics and economic relations change Canberra's outlook and the relationship with the U.S.? Is the evolution in Australian thinking a problem for the U.S. or an opportunity?

May 22- THURSDAY (cont.)

How does Australia's role in the South Pacific and its relationship with Indonesia affect U.S. thinking? Is ANZUS history? If not, what should be done to rejuvenate it? What role can it play?

Presenter: Mr. James Kelly

10:15 AM Coffee Break

10:30 AM Session 6: Issues for the U.S. in Southeast Asia

What are the primary security concerns and challenges in Southeast Asia? How can the U.S. best respond to them? What role can U.S. alliances play? Are there other regional issues for which alliances are not well suited? Topics can also include Islam in Asia and the role of ASEAN and U.S. responses to ASEAN initiatives. This session will also look at U.S. relations with its "friends in Southeast Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam). What is the nature of those relationships? How can they be used to advance U.S. interests in the future? Is this the best relationship with these countries? Should the U.S. to aspire to more? Is that achievable?

Presenter: Ambassador Charles B. Salmon, Jr.

12:30 PM Lunch - *J Bistro –Lobby Level*

2:00 PM Session 7: Issues for the U.S. Southeast Asian Allies

We now turn to U.S. alliances in Southeast Asia. This session explores the nature of alliances with the Philippines and Thailand. How can the U.S. invigorate those relationships? In keeping with this meeting's focus on alliances, speakers should explore the appropriate role for the U.S. military in those relationships and the region.

Presenter: Dr. Stanley Weeks

3:30 PM Coffee Break

3:45 PM Wrap Up Session, Concluding Remarks and Next Steps

4:30 PM Adjourn for the day

Free Evening

APPENDIX C

PACIFIC FORUM CSIS --- YOUNG LEADERS

**Asia Strategy and Policy Report Workshop 2
America's Alliances and the Next Administration**

**Co-hosts: Pacific Forum CSIS
Institute for Defense Analyses
Center for Naval Analysis
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Center for a New American Security**

May 21-22, 2008
DoubleTree Alana Waikiki Hotel, Honolulu Hawaii

MAY 20 – TUESDAY

Participants arrive

5:30PM YL introductory meeting - *Pool Deck –Mezzanine Level*

6:30 PM Reception and Informal Opening Dinner- *Pool Deck –Mezzanine Level*

May 21 – WEDNESDAY

8:30 AM Continental Breakfast - *Room 303 – 3rd floor meeting room*

9:00 AM Welcome and Administrative Remarks

9:15 AM **Session 1: Transformation of U.S. Forces in Asia**

This session will feature a briefing from Pacific Command on the nature of the transformation of U.S. forces in the Pacific. This will provide a context for the discussion of individual alliance relationships that will follow. What is the role that Guam will play in future U.S. thinking about the region? How does this transformation change the U.S. calculus regarding its traditional alliances? What is the impact of U.S. engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan?

10:45 AM Coffee Break

May 21 – WEDNESDAY (cont'd.)

- 11:00 AM Session 2 The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship**
This session focuses on key issues in the US-Japan security relationship, and the alliance in particular. What is the desired relationship? What prevents it from realizing its potential? How can those obstacles be overcome? Should the alliance continue to be the cornerstone of U.S. engagement in Asia? How should the U.S. balance its relationship with Japan with those with Korea and China? How do strategic (nuclear) relations impact this relationship?
- 12:30 PM Lunch - J Bistro –Lobby Level**
- 2:00 PM Session 3: The U.S.-ROK Security Relationship**
This session focuses on key issues in the US-ROK security relationship, and the alliance in particular. What is the desired relationship? What prevents it from realizing its potential? How can those obstacles be overcome? How can the U.S. balance its relationship with Korea with that with Japan? What should the U.S. position be on the transfer of operational command back to the ROK? Discussion of inter-Korean relations should be put off (as best possible) to the next session.
- 3:15 PM Coffee Break**
- 3:30 PM Session 4: Other Developments on The Korean Peninsula**
This session will look at the impact of the Six-Party Talks and progress in U.S.-North Korea relations on the U.S. strategic posture in Asia and Northeast Asia. This session should not focus on the SPT or the appropriate U.S. policy in them (that can be covered in another meeting) but how projected outcomes could affect alliance relations. This session should also address the impact of North-South relations on the U.S.-ROK alliance and the prospects and desirability of a multilateral security framework resulting from these talks.
- 5:00 PM Adjourn for the day**
- 6:30 PM Reception and Dinner - Pool Deck –Mezzanine Level**

May 22 – THURSDAY

- 8:30 AM Continental Breakfast - Room 303 – 3rd floor meeting room**
- 9:00 AM Session 5: The U.S.-Australia Alliance**
This session looks at the state of the U.S.-Australia alliance and its role in America's Asia strategy. How do changes in Australian politics and economic relations change Canberra's outlook and the relationship with the U.S.? Is the evolution in Australian thinking a problem for the U.S. or an opportunity?

How does Australia's role in the South Pacific and its relationship with Indonesia affect

May 22 – THURSDAY (cont'd.)

U.S. thinking? Is ANZUS history? If not, what should be done to rejuvenate it? What role can it play?

10:15 AM Coffee Break

10:30 AM Session 6: Issues for the U.S. in Southeast Asia

What are the primary security concerns and challenges in Southeast Asia? How can the U.S. best respond to them? What role can U.S. alliances play? Are there other regional issues for which alliances are not well suited? Topics can also include Islam in Asia and the role of ASEAN and U.S. responses to ASEAN initiatives. This session will also look at U.S. relations with its "friends in Southeast Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam). What is the nature of those relationships? How can they be used to advance U.S. interests in the future? Is this the best relationship with these countries? Should the U.S. to aspire to more? Is that achievable?

1230 PM Lunch - J Bistro –Lobby Level

2:00 PM Session 7: Issues for the U.S. Southeast Asian Allies

We now turn to U.S. alliances in Southeast Asia. This session explores the nature of alliances with the Philippines and Thailand. How can the U.S. invigorate those relationships? In keeping with this meeting's focus on alliances, speakers should explore the appropriate role for the U.S. military in those relationships and the region.

3:30 PM Coffee Break

3:45 PM Wrap Up Session, Concluding Remarks and Next Steps

4:30 PM Young Leaders wrap-up session

6:00 PM Meet at lower-lobby for Young Leaders dinner (optional)